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The Audit Logic
Policy Compliance in Distributed Systems
Abstract We present a distributed framework where agents
can share data along with usage policies. We use an expres-
sive policy language including conditions, obligations and
delegation. Our framework also supports the possibility to
refine policies. Policies are not enforced a-priori. Instead
policy compliance is checked using an a-posteriri auditing
approach. Policy compliance is shown by a (logical) proof
that the authority can systematically check for validity. Tools
for automatically checking and generating proofs are also
part of the framework.
Keywords Access Control · Audit · Policy · Privacy
1 Introduction
In many situations, there is a need to share data between
potentially untrusted parties while ensuring the data is used
according to given policies.
For example, Alice may need to send CompanyX her e-
mail address, but at the same time she would like CompanyX
not to disclose her email to anyone else. Alice could attach a
policy (e.g. a P3P policy, see below) to her email address re-
flecting this desire but nothing can give Alice the guarantee
that CompanyX will actually follow this policy.
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This situation is common not only when dealing with
web services, but also in a collaborative environment such as
a cross-organization cooperation (when an employee would
like its memo to be used only within a certain project) or in
the medical world (where the health record may be modified
by various doctors, but should remain confidential, e.g. it
should not be disclosed to insurance companies).
There are two main research streams addressing the prob-
lem of guaranteeing that information is actually used in ac-
cordance to policies: on one hand, there is a large body of
literature on access and usage control [14,22,17,6], on the
other hand we find digital rights management (DRM) [24,
8]. While the former assumes a trusted access control ser-
vice restricting data access, the latter assumes a trusted de-
vice in charge of content rendering. Both settings need the
trusted components to be available at the moment the request
happens, to regulate the data access.
However, access control is unsuitable for the collabora-
tive environments we are focusing on, as once an authoriza-
tion has been granted there is no mechanism for controlling
how the data is propagated further. DRM on the other hand
is too rigid and restrictive: all users would have to use the
same special-purpose software and hardware. Also merging
two documents and retransmitting the result to another user
is beyond the possibilities of DRM systems. Indeed, assum-
ing the availability of trusted access control services to re-
strict data access at the moment the request happen can be
sometimes overly restrictive and expensive.
For instance, in the case of protection of private data,
there exist a number of frameworks that have been devel-
oped, but none of them gives the guarantees we are looking
for: the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [23]
is a standardized, XML-based, policy specification languages
that can be used to specify the organization’s privacy prac-
tices in a way that can be parsed and used by policy-checking
agents on a user’s behalf. However, with P3P the user has
no guarantee that an organization follows the policies it has
claimed, because the user has no control over the organiza-
tion’s actions. As another example, the IBM Enterprise Pri-
vacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [4] is an XML-based
privacy policy specification language designed for organi-
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zations to specify and implement internal privacy policies.
EPAL policies can be used throughout an organization and
its business partners to ensure compliance with their under-
lying policies. Also, employees can use EPAL as an “advi-
sor”, to be sure of not violating any policy before doing an
action; However, is is not possible to check if an employee
has indeed violated a policy.
In this paper we develop the fundamental basis for a dif-
ferent, more flexible approach, where no active enforcement
is performed. In our system access control is not enforced
a-priori but is checked a-posteriori. Misuse is not prevented
but deterred: One or more auditing authorities have a man-
date of checking whether the data was used in compliance
with the policies. Hence users should be auditable and suffi-
cient audit trails should be available to the auditors. This fits
well with e.g. hospitals or companies, where users can be
held accountable for their actions and audit trails are often
already part of the (security) requirements. It may be hard
to realize these requirements in other settings, such as large
open networks, or peer to peer (P2P) networks. (However,
this trend may be changing, as for instance nowadays EU
law demands that ISP’s keep IP traffic records of all their
users.)
Going back to the example, in our system, after Compa-
nyX receives Alice’s e-mail address, CompanyX could vi-
olate the policy, for instance by sending Alice’s e-mail to
BadCompanyY and including a “free-to-be-spammed” pol-
icy. However, CompanyX may later be audited by an author-
ity that requests a convincing proof of CompanyX’s permis-
sion to disclose Alice’s e-mail address.
In this paper, we develop a formal framework which de-
scribes the fundamental basis for a system implementing
a-posteriori usage control. In particular, our contribution is
threefold:
– We develop an expressive logic-based policy language to
describe sticky policies, i.e. policies that follow the data
when it is moved across security domains. The language
enables to specify both conditions and obligations.
– We define a derivation system for the language support-
ing the concept of accountability, a notion specifically
tailored to a-posteriori access control.
– We develop and implement two complementary, pivotal
elements of our architecture: A proof checker that allows
an auditing authority to check justification proofs pro-
vided by agents, and a corresponding proof finder which
allows agents to generate valid justification proofs.
Figure 1 shows an example execution in the framework:
In the first step (I), agent a provides a policy φ to agent b
which b records in his log (II). Next (III) agent b reads doc-
ument d which is stored in the company database. At a later
point the auditing authority, which is checking access to pri-
vacy sensitive files, finds the access of b (IV) and requests b
to justify this access (V). In response, b shows that the access
was allowed according to the policy φ which was provided
by a. The auditor, initially unaware of a’s involvement, can
now (VI) audit a for having provided the policy φ to b.
Fig. 1 Sample deployment depicting actions, the logging and interac-
tion with an auditor.
This paper builds on preliminary work [7,9]. In Corin et
al. [9] we outline our framework, and develop the core no-
tions of data and agent accountability. In Cederquist et al. [7]
we extend the policy language to allow variables and quan-
tifiers. This allows us to define a fundamental rule that gives
the ability to refine policies. Agents can create (by refine-
ment) new policies from existing ones, before passing them
to other agents. (In contrast, in [9] the only policies allowed
are those that are explicitly stated by the data owner.) Also,
[7] describes our system more precisely by introducing three
functions, namely the observability, conclusions and proof
obligation functions; it also provides a prototype implemen-
tation of the proof checker in the Twelf logical framework
[19], which allows to model agents providing proofs, and
authorities checking them.
In this paper we provide a revision of [7,9], with detailed
examples, extensions and further explanations. In addition,
as a novel significant contribution, we further develop our
proof system, and prove the key result of cut-elimination.
This allows us to implement an efficient proof finder that
complements our proof checker, and that agents may use to
find valid justification proofs.
The rest of this paper Next, in Section 2 we describe our
policy language, along with a description of the proof sys-
tem. In Section 3 we present the system model and the notion
of accountability. Section 4 describes the proof finder and
proof checker. Section 5 discusses the main advantages and
applicability of our approach. We discuss related work in
Section 6. Section 7 provides conclusions and future work.
Appendix A provides a proof of the cut-elimination property
for our proof system.
2 Actions and Policies
Our setup consists of a group of agents executing different
actions. The permission to execute an action is expressed
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by a policy constructed using a special logic. This section
introduces the components of the architecture, presents the
language we use to express usage policies, and explains how
to reason about policies at audit time.
2.1 Basic Sets
We assume the presence of a set AG = {Alice,Bob, . . .} of
agents and a setDO of data objects. We let a, b, c range over
AG, and d over DO.
2.2 Policies: Permissions, Facts and Actions
Policies are used to express permissions granted to agents,
(e.g., the permission to read a specific piece of data) and
facts are used to express agents properties (e.g., the fact that
an agent is a member of a certain club). We model atomic
permissions and facts as n-ary predicates, p(s1, . . . , sn).
Example 1 Examples are mayRead(a, d), which expresses
that agent a has permission to read data d and partner(a, b)
indicating (the fact) that agent a and b are partners.
Permissions may be guarded by some requirements as in
“Alice may read the data if she is a partner of Bob”, or as in
“Alice may read the data if she pays Bob a one time fee of
$10”. These requirements can be conditions i.e., policies like
“Alice is partner of Bob”, or obligations i.e., requirements
over an action “Alice pays Bob a one time fee of $10”. (See
also [21] for a discussion on conditions and obligations.)
We now introduce our formal policy language:
Definition 1 (Policy Language) The set PO of policies,
ranged over by φ and ψ, is defined by the following gram-
mar:
φ ::= p(s1, ..., sn)
| a owns d
| a says φ to b
| > | φ ∧ φ | ∀x.φ | φ→ φ | ξ → φ
ξ ::= !act |?act
There are two kinds of basic policies. First, predicates of the
form p(s1, ..., sn), where the si are agents or data objects
(possibly variables), express a basic permission or a fact.
Second, the policy a owns d, indicates that a is the owner of
data object d. A data owner is allowed to create usage poli-
cies related to that data. The other policies are compound,
as they contain sub-policies. The policy a says φ to b in-
dicates that agent a is allowed to communicate policy φ to
agent b. Note that, differently from [2], this policy contains
a target agent. This feature allows us to provide a precise
way of communicating policies to certain agents. The pol-
icy a says φ to b has a different meaning for source agent a
than target agent b; for agent a it represents the permission
to send φ to b, while for b it represents the permission to use
policy φ. The trivial policy> does not give any permissions.
The conjunction ∧ and the universal quantification ∀ have
their usual meaning. On the other hand implication →, can
be used in two ways. The first, φ → ψ, has a policy φ as a
condition, stating that the agent first needs to satisfy φ before
obtaining the permission described in ψ. The second, ξ → φ,
is used to express obligations. In this case, the requirement
ξ contains an action act that the agent has to perform before
using φ. The annotations ! and ? indicate whether the agent
needs to do this action every time it uses φ, in ξ → φ, or if it
only needs to do the action once. We will refer to an obliga-
tion ξ as use-once or use-many obligation, respectively. This
will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.
For simplicity, in our policy language, policies can not
be formed using disjunction or existential quantification.
Actions are chosen from a set AC, that contains at least
comm(a ⇒ b, φ), expressing a communication of a policy φ
from agent a to b, and creates(a, d), expressing that the
creator of data d is a. Our system also supports the addition
of user-defined actions.
We use the notation data(φ) for the set of data objects
and data variables that occur in the policy φ. For instance,
we have data(read(b, d)) = {d}.
Example 2 (Policies) The scenario considered in this exam-
ple assumes a system containing a video studio, a rating ser-
vice and a customer. The video studio manages a web site
where clips and trailers are available to be downloaded and
played. The material is subject to a rating system with three
classes: the first class is suitable for all ages, the second is
suitable for people over 13 years old, the last one is suitable
for people over 17. We express that a content d is subjected
to the rating “for all”, ” over 13”, or ”over 17” with the fol-
lowing predicates:
ratedAll(d), ratedPG13(d), ratedNC17(d)
The material owned by the studio is distributed together with
the following set of rate policies:
ratedAll(d)→ φ
ratedPG13(d) ∧ ageover13(b)→ φ
ratedNC17(d) ∧ ageover17(b)→ φ
where the usage policy φ can be:
– A “subscription service”: The subscriber b is allowed to
play any content owned by the Studio:
∀x.(Studio owns x→ mayPlay(b, x))
– A “buy content” policy which allows a subscriber a to
play the content d as often as he wants after having payed
10$ once.
?pay(a, 10$)→ mayPlay(a, d)
– A “pay per view” policy which allows a to play the con-
tent d once after having payed 1$.
!pay(b, 1$)→ mayPlay(b, d)
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REFINE
→I
∀I
→I
[print(b, d)]
rel(d, y)→ print(b, d) a
∀x.rel(d, x)→ print(b, d) a
print(b, d)→  ∀x.rel(d, x)→ print(b, d) a OWNS−E CONCL
creates(a, d)
a owns d
a
a says print(b, d) to b
a
a says
 ∀x.rel(d, x)→ print(b, d) to b a
Fig. 2 Derivation tree that shows the use of the rule REFINE and DER POL. Agent a derives the policy a says ϕ to b that is the policy that
allows her to give to another agent b the policy ϕ, where ϕ =
 ∀x.rel(d, x)→ print(b, d).
2.3 Observability, Proof Obligation and Conclusion
Here we describe the meaning of different actions in terms
of a) the set of agents that can observe them, b) the policy
an agent needs to justify in order to perform an action, and
c) the conclusion an agent can draw by observing an action.
These three properties of actions, which play a fundamen-
tal role in our policy system, are described by the following
functions:
– The observability function: obs : AC → 2AG , where
2AG is the powerset of AG, describing which agents can
observe which actions.
– The proof obligation function: pro : (AC ×AG)→ PO
describes which policy an agent needs to satisfy in order
to justify the execution of an action.
– The conclusion derivation function: concl : (AC×AG)→
PO, describes what policy can an agent deduce after ob-
serving an action.
For the default actions, creates(a, d) and comm(a ⇒ b, φ),
we have:
obs(creates(a, d)) 3 {a} (1)
obs(comm(a⇒ b, φ)) ⊇ {a, b} (2)
pro(creates(a, d), b) = > (3)
pro(comm(a⇒ b, φ), a) = a says φ to b (4)
pro(comm(a⇒ b, φ), c) = > (a 6= c) (5)
concl(creates(a, d), a) = a owns d (6)
concl(creates(a, d), b) = > (b 6= a) (7)
concl(comm(a⇒ b, φ), b) = a says φ to b (8)
concl(comm(a⇒ b, φ), c) = > (c 6= b) (9)
This can be explained intuitively as follows: (1) a creation
action is observable by (at least) the agent who performed
the action. (2) a communication is observable by (at least)
the source and target agent. (3) agents do not need permis-
sions for creating data. (4) in a communication, the source
agent needs a permission. (5) other agents do not. (5) an
agent who creates data can conclude that it is the owner of
the data. (6) other agents cannot conclude anything from a
creation action. (7)) the target agent in a communication can
conclude the corresponding says policy. (8) other agents
cannot conclude anything from a communication.
Remark 1 The action comm(a⇒ b, φ) models point-to-point
communication. We can model broadcasting, by introducing
an action bcast(a, φ), and setting:
obs(bcast(a, φ)) = AG
pro(bcast(a, φ), x) =
{∀y.a says φ to b , if (x = a)
> , otherwise
concl(bcast(a, φ), x) = ∀y.a says φ to b,
Here, every agent can observe the action bcast(a, φ) and
conclude that a has broadcast φ i.e., said φ to everybody.
Notice that only a needs to justify this action.
From an operational point of view we distinguish be-
tween actions and instantiations of actions. Moreover, we
want to distinguish between different instances of the same
action, which is done by labeling each instance with a unique
identifier id, as in createsid(a, d). Formally this gives a
set AC∗ ∈ N → AC of “action instantiations”. While the
observability and proof obligation functions depend on in-
stances of actions (i.e., an identifier), the conclusion deriva-
tion function is purely syntactical.
Example 3 We gather the basic components of the frame-
work needed to describe the scenario introduced in Example
2. We have the following sets of agents:
AG = {Alice,Studio,Rating ,Bank}
Here Alice denotes the customer, Studio denotes the video
studio, and Rating denotes the rating service. Morover, we
have included an additinal entity Bank , the bank where the
custor can pay the fee required by an usage police.
The set of data D is composed by two elements, clip and
trailer ; they model the clip and the trailer, respectively, that
are the targets of this example. The set of possible actions is
as follows:
AC = {creates(b, d), comm(b⇒ d, ϕ)}
{pay(b, n$), play(b, d)}
The first two actions are those included for default in the set
of actions (see Section 2.3) where ϕ ranges over the policies
we have described in the previous section; the last two model
the action of playing, by entity b, of a material d, and the
action of paying, performed by b, of a certain amount n of
dollars, respectively; their meaning is moreover described
in terms of observatibility, proof obligation and conclusion
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derivation as follows:
obs(pay(Alice, n$)) = {Alice,Bank}
obs(play(Alice, trailer)) = {Alice}
obs(play(Alice, clip)) = {Alice}
pro(pay(b, n$), c) = >
pro(play(b, d), b) = mayPlay(b, d)
pro(play(b, d), c) = > if c 6= b
concl(pay(b, n$)) = >
concl(play(b, d), c) = >
2.4 Deriving Policies
This section describes how an agent can derive policies, when
it needs to demonstrate that it had permissions to carry out
the actions it did. This is done by using a derivation sys-
tem or proof system. In this section, the proof system is de-
scribed informally, while in the next section we give the for-
mal definition of it. The derivation system contains the stan-
dard predicate logic rules for introduction and elimination
of conjunction, implication and universal quantification, to-
gether with the following rules:
SAYS−E
b says φ to a
φ
a
REFINE
taut(∧i≤nφi → ψ) a says φi to b (∀i ≤ n)
a says ψ to b
a
CONCL
act
concl(act, a) a
OWNS−E
data(φ) ⊆ {d1, . . . , dn} a owns di (∀i ≤ n)
φ
a
Note that each step in a derivation carries the name a of the
agent that is doing the reasoning.
The rule (SAYS−E) models the delegation of a policy. If
agent a can derive bsaysφtoa then a can assume φ to hold.
Agent a may use φ without further requirement and it is b’s
responsibility to show that it had permission to give φ to a,
see Section 3.3 on accountability. Using the rule (REFINE)
an agent can refine the policies it can delegate. The policy ψ
is a refinement of φ if φ → ψ is a tautology (for all agents,
at all times). Rule (CONCL) links an action act with its con-
clusion, given by the conclusion derivation function concl .
For instance, from observing action comm(a ⇒ φ, b), agent
b derives a says φ to b.
As mentioned already, we designed the logic in such a
way that the owner of some data d decides who is allowed
to do which actions on d. In other words, the owner of some
data d is allowed to derive any policy for d. Rule (OWNS−E)
achieves this goal; it allows the creation of any policy for
data which the agent owns. Non-owners may refine existing
policies (e.g., policies they received), but may not create new
policies from scratch.
Example 4 (Policy Refinement) To illustrate the usage of the
rules (REFINE) and (OWNS−E), suppose that rel(d, d′) ex-
presses that there is a review d of a new product and d′ is
the press release announcing this product. Agent a creates a
new object d and wants to give to agent b the policy
∀x.rel(d, x)→ print(b, d).
This policy gives b the permission to print the document as
soon as a related object exists. Agent a can build the policy
allowing her to give this policy to b as shown in Figure 2.
2.5 Proof System
We now present the proof system that was discussed infor-
mally in the previous section.
The audit logic is formalized as an intuitionistic logic
using sequent calculus. We believe that in our framework
where the authority during auditing may inquire several agents,
the use of constructive proofs makes it easier for the author-
ity keep track of the chains of responsibilities. A proof by
contradiction of the policy “there exists an agent who told
me that I am allowed to . . . ” for instance would not tell the
authority who gave the permission.
There are two reasons for using sequent calculus for the
formalization: First, the sequent calculus uses a notation that
is explicit about which assumptions are used at which step
in the proof. This is convenient because the agents may use
different assumptions. Below we use the (sequent) notation
Γ `a φ to indicate that agent a can prove φ by using the as-
sumptions in Γ . The second reason is more practical: proof
search in sequent calculi can be done almost entirely by a
simple backtracking search. This has allowed us to imple-
ment a proof finder in Prolog in a straightforward way (see
Section 4.3).
The proof system is shown in Figure 3. As earlier, φ and
ψ denote policies, while α denotes an action. Sequents have
the form Γ1;Γ2;∆ `a φ, where a is the agent doing the rea-
soning, and Γ1, Γ2 and ∆ are three different contexts. The
context Γ1 is a list of policies. The context Γ2 is a list of
actions from the agent’s log, which are used to derive con-
clusions using the conclusion derivation function concl , or
as use-once obligations. Finally, the context ∆ is a linear1
context, which is used to model use-once obligations obligs.
The empty context is denoted ². To keep the notation as sim-
ple as possible, when a context is the same in the conclusion
as in the premises, it is left out from the rule. Thus, instead
of writing
Γ1;Γ2;∆ `a φ Γ1;Γ2;∆′ `a ψ
Γ1;Γ2;∆,∆′ `a (φ ∧ ψ) ∧R
we write
; ;∆ `a φ ; ;∆′ `a ψ
; ;∆,∆′ `a (φ ∧ ψ) ∧R.
1 In linear logic assumptions are used exactly once, while our logic
allows weakening. It would be more exact to say that ∆ is an affine
context.
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Γ1;Γ2;∆ `a >>R Γ1, φ;Γ2;∆ `a φ I
Γ1; ;∆ `a φ Γ1, φ; ;∆′ `a ψ
Γ1; ;∆,∆′ `a ψ cut
Γ1, φ1 `a ψ
Γ1, (φ1 ∧ φ2); ;`a ψ∧L1
Γ1, φ2; ;`a ψ
Γ1, (φ1 ∧ φ2); ;`a ψ∧L2
; ;∆ `a φ ; ;∆′ `a ψ
; ;∆,∆′ `a (φ ∧ ψ) ∧R
Γ1; ;∆ `a φ1 Γ1, φ2; ;∆′ `a ψ
Γ1, (φ1 → φ2); ;∆,∆′ `a ψ → L
Γ1, φ; ;`a ψ
Γ1; ;`a (φ→ ψ)→ R
Γ1, φ(x); ;`a ψ
Γ1,∀y. φ(y); ;`a ψ∀L
; ;`a φ(x)
; ;`a ∀y. φ(y)∀R
Γ1, φ; ;∆ `a ψ
Γ1, (!α→ φ); ;∆,α `a ψ !→ L
; ;∆,α `a φ
; ;∆ `a (!α→ φ) !→ R
Γ1, φ;Γ2;`a ψ
Γ1, (?α→ φ);Γ2, α;`a ψ ?→ L
;Γ2, α;`a φ
;Γ2;`a (?α→ φ) ?→ R
Γ1, φ, φ; ;`a ψ
Γ1, φ; ;`a ψ C-L1
;Γ2, α, α;`a ψ
;Γ2, α;`a ψ C-L2
Γ1, φ; ;`a ψ
Γ1, says(b, φ, a); ;`a ψ says-L
Γ1; ²; ² `a ψ
Γ ′1, says(b, Γ1, c);Γ2;∆ `a says(b, says(b, ψ, c))
refine
data(φ) ⊆ {d1, . . . , dn}
Γ1, owns(a, d1), ..., owns(a, dn);Γ2;∆ `a φowns-L
Γ1, concl(α, a);Γ2;`a ψ
Γ1;Γ2, α;`a ψ concl
Fig. 3 The proof system used in the tools.
The first ten rules in the proof system are standard rules
for >, initialization, cut and, left and right rules for con-
junction, implication and universal quantification. The next
four rules are the implication left and right rules for the use-
one and use-many obligations. There are the two contrac-
tion rules (C-L1 and C-L2) for the two non-linear contexts.
The final four rules, says-L, refine, owns-L and concl, cor-
respond to the rules SAY−E, REFINE, OWNS−E and CONCL,
introduced in Section 2.5. In the conclusion of the refine
rule, the formula says(b, Γ1, c) is used as an abbreviation
for list of policies says(b, φ, c) where φ in Γ1. In addition to
the rules shown in Figure 3, there are also permutation rules,
one for each context.
We now discuss the refine rule in greater detail. The
action contexts, in the premise are empty, because (in our
framework) local reasoning should not have any influence
of what can be a refinement of a policy. More precisely,
logged actions are local to agents, and so are the conclu-
sions of these actions. (Cf. the tautology requirement in the
REFINE rule, in Section 2.5.) If non-empty action contexts
were allowed, then an agent may have concluded a certain
policy from an action and then communicated that policy to
an other agent.
In the audit logic, as mentioned in Section 2.5, if an agent
can derive a certain policy, it does not necessarily mean that
it can communicate that policy to other agent. The presence
of the contexts Γ ′,Γ2 and ∆ is to allow for a proof of weak-
ening2, which is a derived rule in our logic.
2 Weakening says that, if a certain property φ can be derived from
the assumptions Γ , then φ can also be derived from Γ, ψ.
We return to the owns-L rule for a discussion about im-
plementation issues in section 4.3.
3 The Model
We now introduce a model for our system, combining the
different components of the previous sections. In our system,
agents can execute and log actions. In addition to agents,
there exist an authority which may audit agents requiring
justification for (some of) the agents actions.
3.1 Logged Actions: The System State
Whenever an agent executes or observes an action, it can
also choose to simultaneously log this action. Logged ac-
tions constitute evidences that can be used to demonstrate
that an agent was allowed to perform a subsequent action,
and are used during accountability auditing, in Section 3.3.
Definition 2 A logged action is a triple lac = 〈act , Γ,∆〉
consisting of an action act ∈ AC, a set of facts Γ ⊆ PO
(the conditions), and a set of actions ∆ ⊂ AC (the ‘use-once
obligations’). We use AC∗ to denote the space of all logged
actions.
When logging an action, an agent can include conditions,
i.e. facts about the current situation that the environment cer-
tifies to be valid at the moment of execution of the action,
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for example the current time. We do not model the environ-
ment explicitly but instead assume that the agent obtains a
secure “package” of signed facts from this environment, rep-
resented by Γ . As an example, one can think of the driver’s
license of Alice being checked to certify that she is over 21.
As an aside note that, to deal more efficiently with facts that
remain true all the time, one could also have a set of ‘global
facts’ which then do not have to be included in each logged
action.
To satisfy the obligations in a policy in the list∆ an agent
may also refer to other actions. This list refers to other ac-
tions the agent did or promises to do. We abstract away from
the details of expressing promises, and instead assume we
have a way to check if actions have expired. The agent has
to perform and log the action before it expires. For example,
the agent may promise to pay within a day. Then a payment
action needs to be done (and logged) within a day of logging
this obligation. (See also Section 3.3.)
Example 5 Suppose that we have an action drink(x, y) and
a corresponding permission mayDrink(x, y), with
concl(drink(x, y), z) = >
pro(drink(x, y), x) = mayDrink(x, y)
pro(drink(x, y), z) = > (z 6= x)
We also introduce an action pay(x, y), with conclusion and
obligation >.
If a pays for and then drinks a beer, it can log these ac-
tions as follows: The payment is recorded in the logged ac-
tion lacpay given by:
lacpay = 〈pay0(a, 10$), ∅, ∅〉
Then, when drinking the beer paid for in the previous action,
a logs lacdrink given by:
lacdrink = 〈drink1(a, beer),
{age21(a), alc(beer)},
{pay0(a, 10$)}〉
The log of an agent a is a finite sequence of logged ac-
tions. Note that it does not need to be a who performed the
actions, but of course a has to observe an action to be able to
log it. We say that agent a logs action act when 〈act , Γ,∆〉
is appended to the log of a for some list of conditions Γ and
some list of obligations∆. The log of an agent represents the
(usable) information an agent has about the system, in other
words, the logs of all agents constitute the system state.
Definition 3 A system state S is a collection of logs of the
different agents, i.e. a mapping from agents to lists of logged
actions S : AG → AC∗. We denote by S the collection of
all states.
Agents cannot just log anything; besides the assumptions
that actions are only logged when they happen and that the
conditions logged are certified by the environment we also
assume some basic consistency properties of the logs:
– An agent logs the same action at most once, i.e. there
cannot be two different logged actions 〈act id, Γ,∆〉 and
〈act id, Γ ′,∆′〉 in the log for the same action act id.
– An action can only be used one time as a use-once obli-
gation, i.e. an action actid may not occur in the obliga-
tions ∆ of two different logged actions in the log.
– An agent cannot log an expired action.
The consistency of the log does not have to be checked at
time of logging, it is sufficient to check it at time of auditing.
3.2 Executing Actions in the System
The system model is defined as a labeled transition system:
Definition 4 A system is a tuple: 〈S, S0,L,→〉, where S the
set of all states as introduced in Definition 3, S0 ∈ S is the
initial state in which all logs are empty, L = AC × P(AG)
is the transition labels consisting of an action and a set of
agents that log that action, and → ⊆ S × LAB × S is
the transition relation. We use the notation S act,L−→ S′ for
(S, (act , L), S′) ∈ →.
A transition models an action happening in the system
and being logged by some agents observing the action. Thus
we have S act,L−→ S′ when L is a subset of obs(act), S′(A) =
S(A) for A /∈ L and S′(A) = S(A).act for A ∈ L where
act is a log of action act by agent A. In other words, S′ is
the same as S except that act has been logged by the agents
in L.
An execution of the system in the definition above con-
sists of a sequence of transitions S0
act1,L1−−−−−→ . . . actn,Ln−→ Sn,
starting with the (empty) initial state S0. The execution trace
for this execution is act1 . . . , actn. In a state S the log S(a)
of an agent a can also be seen as a trace of actions (by ignor-
ing the conditions and obligations logged with the actions).
As a’s log is initially empty and a can only log actions that
actually do occur, the log is a sub-trace of the execution
trace, i.e. we have Sn(a) ¹ tr, where ¹ denotes the sub-
trace relation (tr1 ¹ tr2 iff tr1 can be obtained from tr2 by
leaving out actions but maintaining the order of the remain-
ing actions).
Example 6 (An Execution Trace) First we describe some events,
then we give the execution trace in detail. First the Studio
enlists the Rating Service to rate his content, and on the re-
lease date it also provides the permission to publish the rat-
ings. The customer, Alice, download and watches content
produced by Studio; when necessary she also performs the
actions required by the policies that are attached to the ma-
terials she gets from the Studio. The execution trace is as
follows.
– the Studio creates the content clip and a trailer , and logs
these actions.
S0 = ∅
act1 = creates(Studio, clip)
act2 = creates(Studio, trailer)
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As the Studio does not need to satisfy any conditions or
obligation for creating the content, the creation is logged
as 〈act i, ∅, ∅〉 (i = 1, 2). We use the notation S · a 7→
〈 , , 〉 to indicate that S is extended by appending action
〈 , , 〉 to the log of agent a.
S1 = S0 · Studio 7→ 〈act1, ∅, ∅〉
S2 = S1 · Studio 7→ 〈act2, ∅, ∅〉
– The Studio enlists the rating service to rate this content.
On the release date, the Studio provides permission to
publish the ratings, with the following policy φcr (stand-
ing for “can rate”):
φcr(a, d) := ∀x. a says (ratedAll(d)) to x
∧ a says (ratedPG13(d)) to x
∧ a says (ratedNC17(d)) to x
The action of communicating the policy is performed by
Studio, and logged by Rating:
act3 = comm(Studio ⇒ Rating , φ1cr ∧ φ2cr),
where
φ1cr = φcr(Rating , clip)
φ2cr = φcr(Rating , trailer)
After the logging the state is updated as follows:
S3 = S2 · Rating 7→ 〈act3, ∅, ∅〉
– Visiting the Studio’s web-site Alice finds the trailer which
the Studio provides for free. Trailers, by the way, are sub-
jected to the following rate policies
φall(a, d) := ratedAll(d)
φage13(a, d) := ratedPG13(d) ∧ ageover13(a)
φage17(a, d) := ratedNC17(d) ∧ ageover17(a)
Then, when downloading a specific trailer Alice also re-
ceive the policy related to that piece of data. For exam-
ple, if trailer (the trailer that Alice download) is suitable
for all the ages the action performed is as follows:
act4 = comm(Studio⇒ Alice, ϕ),
where
ϕ = φall(Alice, trailer)→ mayPlay(Alice, trailer)
The action of downloading is logged by Alice, and the
log the state is updated as follows:
S4 = S3 ·Alice 7→ 〈act4, ∅, ∅〉
– Alice obtains the rating of the trailer, ratedAll(trailer),
from Rating, which expresses that the trailer has no age
restriction. Again this action is logged by Alice:
act5 = comm(Rating ⇒ Alice, ratedAll(trailer))
S5 = S4 ·Alice 7→ 〈act5, ∅, ∅〉
– Alice watches the trailer on her device, which logs the
action:
act6 = play(Alice, trailer)
S6 = S5 ·Alice 7→ 〈act6, ∅, ∅〉
– Alice obtains the video clip, clip, with the “pay per view”
(1$) license from Studio. She also obtains the rating from
the Rating Service (the trailer can seen by anyone who is
over 13 years):
act7 = comm(Studio ⇒ Alice, ϕ)
where,
ϕ = φage13(Alice, clip)→(
!pay(Alice, 1$)→ mayPlay(Alice, clip))
S7 = S6 ·Alice 7→ 〈act8, ∅, ∅〉
act8 = comm(Rating ⇒ Alice, ratedPG13(clip))
S8 = S7 ·Alice 7→ 〈act7, ∅, ∅〉
– Next she pays for and plays the video clip. When Alice
logs the play action, she also records that she is over 13
and that she has paid for this content.
act9 = pay(Alice, 1$)
S9 = S8 ·Alice 7→ 〈act9, ∅, ∅〉
act10 = play(Alice, clip)
S10 = S9 ·Alice 7→
〈 act10,
{ageover13(Alice)},
{!act9}
〉
The execution trace for this scenario is act1 . . . act10. The
trace of actions logged by Alice, viz. S10(Alice), is act4 . . . act10.
3.3 Accounting for Executed Actions
Agents may be audited by some auditing authority, at some
point in the execution of the system. Intuitively, when some
agent is about to be audited, an auditing authority is formed.
This authority will audit the agent to find whether it is able
to account for its actions. The knowledge of the auditing au-
thority is represented by an ‘evidence’ trace E which is a
sub-trace of the execution of the system (up till now). Which
actions are in E depends on the power (and possibly the in-
terests) of the authority; a more powerful authority will in
general be able to collect a larger evidence trace.
Definition 5 (Accountability) We say that an agent A cor-
rectly accounts for an action act if it provides a valid proof
of Γ1, Γ2, ∆ `a pro(act , A) where Γ2 is a list of actions
from the log of A and Γ1,∆ are the conditions and obli-
gations3 logged with the action if A logged this action or
empty otherwise. The new actions revealed by the proof are
the actions in Γ2 and∆which are not already in the evidence
trace E .
We say an agent A passes the audit (or accountability
test) E , written ACC(A, E), if it correctly accounts for all
actions in E and for all actions revealed by proofs it provides.
3 The obligations are labeled actions rather than actions. Thus to be
precise we should say ∆ is the list obtained by removing the labels
from the actions in the list of obligations.
The Audit Logic 9
An agent has to account for the actions in the evidence
trace by providing a valid proof. If it logged the action, it can
use the conditions and obligations it logged with the action
in the proof. If it did not log the action it will have to provide
a proof without any conditions or obligations. This shows
why it is advantageous for agents to log actions.
In providing a proof, the agent may reveal actions that
were not yet known to the auditing authority. These actions
are added to the actions to be audited i.e. the evidence trace.
Above we only consider a single agent but it is also possi-
ble to have an authority which iteratively audits all agents
involved in actions in the evidence trace. In this case newly
revealed actions may require the authority to revisit agents
or add new agents to its list. (However, as the number of
actions to be audited is always limited by the number of ac-
tions executed in the system we know the process will still
terminate.)
Example 7 (Auditing) Let us now assume that an auditing
authority is formed which audits Alice. The initial evidence
trace E of the authority consists of act4 . . . act10.
The only actions which Alice has to justify, w.r.t. E are
the actions act6 and act10; they are the only actions for
which she has a proof obligation.
pro(act6,Alice) = pro(play(Alice, trailer),Alice)
= mayPlay(Alice, trailer)
pro(act10,Alice) = pro(play(Alice, clip),Alice)
= mayPlay(Alice, clip)
Justification Proof. We show how Alice produces a justifi-
cation proof for the logged action
〈act10, {ageover13(Alice)}, {!act9}〉
Alice needs to prove the following policy:
pro(act10,Alice) = pro(play(Alice, clip),Alice)
= mayPlay(Alice, clip).
Then she uses a proof finder to find the proof. She can use
the condition ageover13(Alice) and the obligation !act9.
The proof is shown in Figure 4.
A justification proof for the logged action 〈act6, ∅, ∅〉
can be provided in a similar way. It is reported in Figure 6
Honest Strategy A straightforward strategy for an honest
agent A to be able to pass any audit is to, before execut-
ing an action act , derive the proof obligation pro(act , a). If
any obligation needs to be fulfilled, the agent fulfills it and
logs the actions. If any condition or obligation needs to be
fulfilled, then the action act itself is also logged.
Remark 2 (Accountability of honest agents) If agent A fol-
lows the honest strategy, then for any system execution and
any auditing authority with evidence trace E , we have that
ACC(A, E) holds.
4 Implementation
In this section we describe how we implemented the two
principal components of our framework: the proof checker
to be used by the auditors to check justification proofs and
the proof finder to be used by the agents to find compliance
proofs. But before we go into details about the implementa-
tions, we briefly describe how the proof finder and the proof
checker interact.
4.1 Proof Checking and Proof Finding
Assume that an agent a has performed an action α and that
the auditing authority wants a to justify. (See Figure 5.) First,
(1) agent a is audited for action α at time t. Agent a now
selects an excerpt ² of its log and a policy φ that is a’s proof
obligation for action α and (2) tries to find a proof of ² `a φ
with the proof finder. Then (3) the proof pi and the excerpt
² are sent to the auditor for checking (4) and finally, (5) the
auditor checks that pi is indeed a proof of ² `a φ by using
the proof checker (6).
4.2 The Proof Checker
The audit logic allows authorities to check that compliance
proofs are valid. To support this, we formalized the infer-
ence rules of the proof system, using the logical framework
Twelf [19]. Twelf uses the propositions-as-types correspon-
dence, also called the Curry-Howard isomorphism. Proof
checking in Twelf thus reduces to type-checking. Earlier re-
search in proof-carrying code has shown that Twelf uses a
convenient notation for proofs to be sent and checked by a
recipient [3,25,16]. This notation can be seen in Figure 6.
The implementation of the inference rules in Twelf consists
of about 100 lines of code.
Let us now return to the owns-L rule, in the proof system
(Figure 3). It is cumbersome to define (in Twelf) the set of
data data(φ) that the policy φ depends on. Set-theory would
be required to define data for compound policies. However
φ in the owns-L rule can be restricted to atomic policies,
Fig. 5 The role of the tools in the event of an audit.
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thm: (entail alice
(cons (ageOver13 alice) nil)
(cons (comm rating alice (ratedPG13 clip)) (cons (comm studio alice
(imp (and (ageOver13 alice) (ratedPG13 clip)) (!imp (pay alice bank)
(mayPlay alice clip)))) (cons (pay alice bank) nil)))
(cons (pay alice bank) nil)
(mayPlay alice clip))=
(obs_act (obs_act (says_l (imp_l (and_r (perm_g1_2 init) (says_l init) append_nil)
(!imp_l init) append_nil)) concl_comm) concl_comm).
Fig. 4 Alice’s proof that she may play a clip provided she paid the bank.
provided we add the rule
Γ1, says(b, (owns(a, d)), c); ;`a says(b, ψ, c)
Γ1, owns(a, d); ;`a says(b, ψ, c) owns-says.
It can be shown that the proof system obtained in this way
is sound and complete with respect to the one in Figure 3.
Soundness follows since, owns-says is provable using cut,
the general form of owns-L and weakening. Completeness
can be shown by proving (the general) owns-L, by case-
analysis over φ. If φ is atomic, then the restricted form of
owns-L is applicable. If φ is of the form says(b, ψ, c), then
φ can be stripped using owns-says and refine. If φ is of an-
other compound form, then φ can be stripped using other
rules. In owns-says, the formula on the right side of the en-
tailment relation `a is restricted to satisfy the sub-formula
property.
4.3 The Proof Finder
To respond to audits, an agent should be able to find com-
pliance proofs based on its log. To do this in an automated
manner, we implemented a proof finder (automatic theorem
prover), using SWI-Prolog. While the proof checker is an
implementation of the inference rules in Twelf, the proof
finder consists of a representation of the inference rules in
Prolog, together with some modules for the generation of the
proof in a format appropriate for the proof checker. There are
about 400 lines of Prolog code.
Cut Elimination For the proof system presented here, the
cut rule is admissible, i.e., if a policy is derivable using the
cut rule then there is also a derivation of that policy with-
out cut. Although cut-admissibility holds for the sequent cal-
culus formalization of first-order logics[12], it is not trivial
that it also holds for our logic, having introduced new logi-
cal rules to deal with says to and owns. The cut-elimination
proof is included in the appendix. Cut-elimination has two
important consequences: First, the sub-formula property4 is
satisfied, allowing for a more efficient proof search. Second,
consistency of the logic is a consequence of cut-admissibility.5
4 The formulas used in the premises are sub-formulas of those in the
conclusion.
5 Without the cut-rule, consistency normally follows, since there is
no other rule that can introduce falsity. For the audit logic, it is easy to
see that the formula (∀a, d. a owns d) cannot be introduced without
cut (except in some degenerated cases).
Prolog’s resolution (backtracking) algorithm is used to
perform proof search. In spite of cut-admissibility, the proof
finder does not always terminate. The audit logic is an ex-
tension of (the fragment without disjunction and existential
quantification of) predicate logic, which is in general un-
decidable, only certain fragments are decidable [11]. Note
however that in our framework, since proof finding is only
done by the agents, undecidability has no impact on the au-
thority. In many other access control frameworks a decidable
fragment of predicate logic is chosen, to prevent that unde-
cidability complicates security decisions.
A sample proof output by the proof finder is reported in
Figure 6. The proposition to be proven is written before the
’=’ sign. The proof is after the ’=’ sign.
To compare the different formalizations we show in Fig-
ure 7 how the says-L rule is written in the Twelf code and
in the Prolog code. In the Prolog code, the second line in
the says-L rule, is used to find a permutation of Γ1 such that
a says φ to b is on the first position. This replaces the need
for separate permutation rules in the proof finder (see Fig-
ure 3), which would be inefficient. When such a permuta-
tion is found, then the context is permuted and permutation
steps are printed in the proof for the proof checker. Because
these permutation steps can become lengthy, we abbreviate
using lemma’s, that are available at the proof checker, i.e.
perm g1 2 is the lemma which takes the second element of
Γ1 and puts it in the first position. For the full source code
of both tools, we refer to our online demo [1].
Note that the demonstrated proof finder is by no means
a state-of-the-art theorem prover. But it shows a possible ap-
proach to implement policy-based access control. A future
possibility may be to use lean theorem proving [5], which
is particularly fast at solving simple problems but slower for
complex logical problems.
5 Discussion
Having completed the description of the framework we now
discuss questions relating to the practical applicability of the
framework.
How expressive is the framework? We have presented a
flexible framework with an expressive language containing a
fine grained form of delegation. The framework also enables
the use of use-once obligations thus allowing a permission to
be ‘consumed’ when it it used. The policies in the languages,
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thm: (entail alice
(cons (ageOver13 alice) nil)
(cons (comm studio alice (forall G304:tm object (imp (ratedAll
G304) (mayPlay alice G304))))
(cons (comm rating alice (ratedAll trailer)) nil))
nil
(mayPlay alice trailer))=
(obs_act (obs_act (says_l (perm_g1_2 (says_l (forall_l (imp_l init init
append_nil))))) concl_comm) concl_comm).
Fig. 6 A sample of the output of the proof finder.
Γ1, φ `a ψ
Γ1, says(b, φ, a) `a ψ says-L
%% twelf: says_l rule
says_l: entail A (cons Phi Gamma1) Gamma2 Delta Psi ->
entail A (cons (says B Phi A) Gamma1) Gamma2 Delta Psi.
%prolog: says_l rule
entail(A,Gamma1,Gamma2,Delta,Psi,[Perms,’ (says_l’,Pf,’)’,Bras]):-
perm([says(_,Phi,A)],Tail,Gamma1,g1,Perms,Bras),
entail(A,[Phi|Tail],Gamma2,Delta,Psi,Pf).
Fig. 7 The says-L rule in formal notation, in Twelf code and in Prolog code.
however, can only be used to express permissions. It is not
possible to express prohibitions, i.e. policies which forbid
a certain action. Note that prohibitions are typically prob-
lematic in a distributed setting where messages can get lost,
agents can be offline, etc. (See also comparison with other
approaches in the next section and future work described in
Section 7.)
For which application areas is the framework suitable?
We have shown in the examples that the framework is ap-
plicable to a content protection scheme. As mentioned in
the introduction, the framework also fits well the protection
of private data: Privacy regulations typically require that the
subject of the data can decide how data is to be used, i.e. de-
cide the policy for the data. This requires a flexible, data
oriented policy framework such as our audit logic. Also, pri-
vacy regulations often require protection of data but do not
require that misuse of data is completely impossible, again
fitting with our auditing approach where misuse is deterred
rather than prevented. Although the framework is not ap-
plicable in areas where strict guarantees are needed it can
be combined with access control mechanism as a method to
check usage of data after access has been granted.
How realistic are the assumptions for the framework?
For our auditing logic we make several assumption about
the environment the framework is applied in. The most ob-
vious requirement for the audit logic is that agents are au-
ditable i.e. that agents can be held accountable for their ac-
tions. Additionally there must be an auditing authority that
is authorized to do audits. To let the auditing be an effec-
tive deterrent against policy violation, the authority should
be able to gain knowledge of and audit a significant portion
of the executed actions. When we consider a scenario with
cooperating companies these conditions are typically met.
The auditing processes can simply be a formalization of the
audit trails which are already common practice. In other set-
tings such as open systems, it may be hard to hold agents
accountable for their actions.
How realistic other assumptions are again depends on
the scenario and on the actions being executed. For exam-
ple, the requirement of secure logging is an abstraction of
several techniques that would need to be applied. When an
agent claims that an action has happened then the authority
should be able to check this. For communication one needs
to achieve unforgeability of messages; A simple signature
is already sufficient to show that an agent was indeed given
a policy by another agent, but if e.g. the time of sending is
important or agents may be working together against an au-
ditor then stronger mechanisms need to applied. The choice
of implementation techniques needs to be matched with the
requirements for the specific scenario.
We have assumed that delegation of responsibility is al-
ways possible; an agent can use all policies it receives. One
may want to restrict this by requiring some trust in the agent
that provides the credential. (See also the discussion in Sec-
tion 7.)
How efficient is the framework? Although the audit log-
ical is in theory undecidable, this is not necessarily an is-
sue in practice [3]. When building proofs a user typically
only needs to take a limited, and definitely finite set of ac-
tions, users and data items into account. Proof finding may
still be difficult on resource constrained devices. Libraries
of standard proofs for often used policies and actions could
be used in such cases. The audits can also be performed ef-
ficiently; the auditor only needs to check a provided proof
which is a simple task. To log an action, a few facts need
to be recorded. It seems likely that this can be done using
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a relatively small amount of storage. Also, the logging is
completely distributed and agents only need to record ac-
tions that they observe and in which they are interested. Still,
as the system runs the logs of agents grows. A method to
remove actions from the log that have been correctly ac-
counted for or actions that provide permissions that are no
longer needed will likely be needed in a practical applica-
tion.
How usable is the framework? Thanks to the automatic
proof finding tool the user only needs to select the obliga-
tions to use and ‘press the button’ to obtain a proof. The
policy language uses intuitive and easy to understand oper-
ators but a policy can quickly become hard to read when it
grows. If, for example, a user needs to consent to a policy,
this policy and its consequences should be clear. Thanks to
its logical nature, the policy language is suitable for check-
ing that a given policy satisfies certain requirements. For ex-
ample, a user could check if the suggested policy is a refine-
ment of its own preferred policies. Nevertheless, tools for
readable presentation of policies such as available for well
established systems, such as P3P for privacy, would aid in a
more widespread applicability.
6 Related Work
The framework presented here describes a logic for policies
combined with a-posteriori allowance checks of performed
actions. Compared to access control, in our framework, ac-
cess is always granted; only later it is determined whether
the requestor had permission to do what it did.
There is a large body of literature on logics in Access
Control (see the survey by Abadi [2]). Here, we mention
some of the proposals. John DeTreville designed Binder [10],
a logic-based security language based on Datalog. Binder in-
cludes a special predicate, says, used to quote other agents.
Our says construct differs in two aspects from Binder’s: First,
ours includes a target agent (see Section 2.4); Second, we
allow nested says, while, when communicating a policy (i.e.
importing a clause in Binder), care must be taken to avoid
nested says, since it may introduce difficulties in their set-
ting.
BLF [25] is an implementation of a Proof-Carrying-Code
framework that uses both Binder and Twelf, which however
focuses on checking semantic code properties of programs.
Sandhu and Samarati [22] give an account of access con-
trol models and their applications. Bertino et al. [6] pro-
pose a framework for reasoning on access control models,
in which authorization rules treat the core components Sub-
jects, Objects and Privileges. Sandhu and Park [17] take a
different approach with their UCON-model, in which the
decision is modeled as a reference monitor that checks the
three components: ACL, Conditions and Obligations. This
inspired the separation we made in this paper. Obligations
and conditions are also prominent in directives on privacy
and terms of use in DRM. In the work of Samarati et.al. [20],
a discussion about decentralized administration is presented.
Specially, the revocation of authorizations is addressed. We
do not address such issues in our framework.
In the privacy languages P3P and E-P3P [4], policies
describe which actions will be performed on private data.
There are some fundamental differences between the P3P
framework and our audit logic. In P3P, policies are not cre-
ated by the subjects of the data and sent. Instead policies are
already in place and may even be unknown to the subjects.
The concept of purpose of an action is used. E-P3P also uses
negation of policies to meant that certain actions will not be
performed, this requires special care to avoid problems in a
distributed setting.
More related to our auditing by means of proofs, Appel
and Felten [3] propose the Proof-Carrying Authentication
framework (PCA), also implemented in Twelf. Differently
from our work, PCA’s language is based on a higher order
logic that allows quantification over predicates. Their says
predicate does not have a target (unlike ours) and it satisfies
φ⇒ a says φ and a says φ & a says (φ→ ψ)⇒ a says ψ.
Their system is implemented as an access control system
for web servers, while in our case we focus on a-posteriori
auditing.
Another logic for access control is presented in a manuscript
by Garg and Pfenning [13]. Their logic is constructive (like
ours) and they prove that the cut-rule is admissible (like we
do). They have a says construct with similiar properties as
the says in [3]. Garg and Pfenning also introduce a concept
of non-interference for access control policies, to character-
ize classes of policies (propositions) whose presence or ab-
sence has no effect on proofs of certain other policies.
In our framework, unlike [3] and [13] policies depend on
agents’ logs and we also consider conditional obligations.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a flexible usage policy framework which
enables expressing and reasoning about policies and user ac-
countability. Enforcement of policies is difficult (if not im-
possible) in the highly distributed setting we are consider-
ing. Instead, we propose an auditing system with best-effort
checking by an authority depending on the power of the au-
thority to observe actions. A notion of agent accountability
is introduced to express the proof obligation of an agent be-
ing audited. To the best of our knowledge, the framework
presented here (an extension of our earlier work [7,9]) is
the first to describe a logic for policies combined with a-
posteriori compliance checks of performed actions.
Our proof system has been formalized using the proof
checker Twelf and a proof finder has been implemented in
Prolog. Agents can develop proofs using the proof finder and
the proof checker allows an authority to check the agents’
proofs.
Our obligations cover pre- and post-obligations but not
yet ongoing obligations [21]. The setup does, with an adap-
tion of the definitions of accountability, seem to provide the
means to include this type of obligations. The obligations in
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our framework are both ‘use once’, e.g. !pay($10) and ‘use
as often as needed’ ?pay($10).
In our system, we have a rule for delegation of policies.
If an agent X says a policy φ to Alice, then Alice may use
φ without any requirements and it is X’s responsibility to
show that it had the permission to say φ to Alice. However,
Alice may only want to use a policy from X if she (i) knows
X, (ii) authenticates X, and (iii) trusts X. All these issues
are (intentionally) abstracted away in our approach, as they
seem to be orthogonal to our aims. For example, in (iii), the
required level of trust may depend on the policy provided
by X or on the way Alice is going to use the policy. There,
a distributed trust management system (e.g. [15]) could be
employed to obtain the required level of trust.
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A Cut-elimination
In this section we proof a so called cut elimination theorem stating that
the cut rule is actually redundant; anything proven using the cut rule
can also be proven without using this rule. The cut-rule can be written
as follows.
Γ `a φ Γ, φ `a ψ
Γ `a ψ cut
Here φ is called the cut-formula. Below we do not consider the left
and right rules for obligations, as they do not interfere with the cut-
elimination property. For readability, we only write the non-linear con-
text Γ in the sequents in this section, as the other two contexts are
irrelevant for this proof. For the same reason, in the sequel we ignore
the left and right rules for !→ and ?→.
The cut elimination can be phrased in words as: When we can
proof some lemma (φ) and prove a formula ψ using this lemma then
the formula ψ can also be proven directly. Not having this very intu-
itive property would indicate a very exotic logical system indeed. Cut-
elimination theorems, due to Gentzen, are considered a central issue in
field of logics. A cut-elimination theorem exists for first-order logic as
well as for a number of other standard logical systems. The elimination
of a cut rule often plays an important role in showing consistency and
decidability of a logic.
Another reason, described in Section 4, for eliminating the cut rule
is that the rule does not satisfy the so called sub-formula property; the
cut-formula in the premise may be completely absent in the conclu-
sion. The sub-formula property is important to be able to implement
an efficient proof search. Thus for proof search one can simply restrict
to the system without the cut rule.
14 J. G. Cederquist et al.
A.1 The Proof
For proving the cut elimination theorem for our logic we follow a stan-
dard approach [18]: We show by induction that proofs including a cut
rule can be transformed into proofs without this rule.
Our induction assumption states that, if we have a cut free proofD
for Γ ` φ and a cut free proof E for Γ, φ ` ψ then we also have a cut
free proof F for Γ ` ψ. This induction assumption is applied if the
cut formula (φ) is simplified or if the cut formula stays the same and
one of the proofs is shortened (and the other proof is not lengthened).
Note that any proof for Γ ` φ can be weakened to a proof for
Γ, ψ ` φ by using the same rules but simply adding ψ in each step.
We distinguish the following cases, based on the last rule used in
the proofs D and E . Below, a formula is called principal in the rule,
if the rule explicitly introduces the formula (either left or right of the
`). For clarity we show a table with the cases for D and E . Here pr.
denotes principal.
D init D owns-L φ not pr. in D φ pr. in D
E init 1 2 2 2
E owns-L 1 3 5 4
φ not pr. in E 1 6 5 6
φ pr. in E 1 3 5 7
The rules init and owns-L are the base-cases of the induction over
the length of the derivation, so we treat them first. Please note that
in the proof we ignore the rules concerning use once and use many
obligations, ! → R, ! → L, ? → R and ? → L, and the >R rule,
which amount to trivial cases below.
1. D ends in I. When D consist of a single init (I) rule,
D :
Γ ′, φ ` φ I
(i.e. Γ = Γ ′, φ) then applying contraction to Γ ′, φ, φ ` ψ, which
is the conclusion of E , gives us the required sequence Γ ′, φ ` ψ.
Thus E followed by contraction is a cut-free proof for this sequent.
2. E ends in I. When E consists of a single init (I) rule and φ is used,
E :
Γ, ψ ` ψ I
then the cut-formula is ψ and a cut-free derivation of ψ is simply
D. Otherwise, if φ is not used,
E :
Γ ′, ψ, φ ` ψ I
(i.e. Γ = Γ ′, ψ), then a cut-free proof for the required sequent
Γ ′, ψ ` ψ is a single application of the init (I) rule.
3. D ends in owns-L. WhenD consists of a single application of the
owns-L rule, then φ is atomic (see Section 4.2),
D :
Γ ′, owns(a, d) ` φowns-L
so if φ is principal in the last inference in E then this inference
must use rule init (I), covered in 2, or owns says or ownsl. In the
latter two cases, one can simply contract the context to obtain the
required sequent. In case φ is not principal in E’s last step then
we can apply the induction assumption for a smaller proof E , see
case 6.
4. E ends in owns-L. When E is owns-L and φ is used, then φ is an
owns-predicate.
E :
Γ, owns(a, d) ` ψ owns-L
There are no cases for φ principal in D’s last step except init and
owns-L, both treated in the cases 1 and 3. In case φ is not prin-
cipal in D’s last step we can apply the induction assumption for a
smaller proofD, see case 5. Otherwise if φ is not used in owns-L,
E :
Γ, φ, owns(a, d) ` ψ owns-L,
then a cut-free derivation ofψ is a single application of the owns-L
rule.
5. φ is not principal in D. The cut-formula is not principal in the
derivation D if the derivation ends in one of the (left) rules: →L,
∀L, ∧L1, ∧L2, says-L, concl, owns says. As an example we do
the case for says-L.
If the proof D consists of proof D1 followed by says-L:
D : Γ
′, φ1 ` φ
Γ ′, says(b, φ1, c) ` φ says-L E : Γ
′, says(b, φ1, c), φ ` ψ
then by weakening D1 by adding says(b, φ1, c) and weakening E
by adding φ1 we get proofs for Γ ′, φ1, says(b, φ1, c) ` φ and
Γ ′, φ1, says(b, φ1, c), φ ` ψ thus by induction (the weakened
D1 is shorter than D and the weakened E is the same length as
E) there is a cut-free proof for Γ ′, φ1, says(b, φ1, c) ` ψ By ap-
plying says-L and then contraction we get to the required sequent
Γ ′, says(b, φ1, c) ` ψ.
With the same trick of weakening, one proves the cases for the
other left rules.
6. φ is not principal in E . It is easy to see we can apply the induction
assumption on the D and E1, which is E without the last step, to
obtain a cut free proofF1 and then apply the same right rule as the
righthand side of the sequents proven by E1 and F1 are the same.
7. φ is principal in both D and E . Now there is one case left, i.e.
where the cut-formula φ is principal in the last rule of D and E .
Here we split cases for different forms of the cut-formula and use
the induction assumption for a sub-formula of the cut-formula.
(a) Subcase φ = φ1 → φ2. There is one case for the last infer-
ence of D:
D : Γ, φ1 ` φ2
Γ ` (φ1 → φ2)→ L
and E’s last inference must be→L:
E : Γ ` φ1 Γ, φ2 ` ψ
Γ, (φ1 → φ2) ` ψ → L
We can apply the induction assumption on the premise in D
and the first premise in E to obtain a cut-free proof for Γ ` φ2
and again use the induction assumption on this proof and the
second premise in E to obtain a cut-free proof the required
sequent. (Both cases use a simpler cut formula.) The cases for
φ with the connectives ∧ and ∀ are done in the same way.
(b) Subcase φ = says(b, φ1, c). There is one case for the last
inference in D:
D : Γ
′ ` φ1
Γ ′′, says(b, Γ ′, c) ` says(b, φ1, c) refine
Then E’s last inference must be refine or says-L. In the case
of says-L, c is the same as a so,
E : Γ
′′, says(b, Γ ′, a), φ1 ` ψ
Γ ′′, says(b, Γ ′, a), says(b, φ1, a) ` ψ says-L
By replacing the refine inD by a repeated application of says-
L for each proposition in Γ ′, and then weakening with Γ ′′,
one gets a (cut-free) proof of Γ ′′, says(b, Γ ′, a) ` φ1. Now
the cut-rule can be used to derive ψ, and the cut-formula is
smaller hence by the induction assumption there is a cut-free
derivation of Γ ′′, says(b, Γ ′, a) ` ψ.
On the other hand, when E ends in refine,
Γ ′, φ1 ` ψ1
Γ ′′, says(b, Γ ′, c), says(b, φ1, c) ` says(b, ψ1, c) refine
then the induction assumption can be applied for the proofs
D1 and E1 of the premises to reach the required sequent with-
out the use of either refine-rule.
(c) Subcase φ is atomic. There are two cases for the last step in
D (where φ is principal), being init and ownsl, treated in the
cases 1 and 3.
This completes the proof. 2
